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Abstract 
Bid design is an important component of the nonmarket valuation process. To date, no 
research has been done on the possible effects of using round dollar amounts. It seems 
reasonable to believe that respondents may respond to round dollar amounts differently 
than they would respond to bids that include both dollar and cent amounts. One 
possibility is that the respondent may infer that the dollar/cent bids are more precise 
estimates of the true cost than the round dollar amount, and therefore put more thought 
into their response to survey questions.  
 
In order to explore this idea, we test whether the use of a precise versus imprecise bid 
design influences respondent’s willingness to pay. In particular, our sample of survey 
recipients was stratified into two groups based on whether they were presented with 
imprecise or precise bids (round dollar bids or dollar/cent bids). Precise bids were 
generated by adding or subtracting a randomly-drawn number of cents (between -200 and 
+200 cents) to each of the imprecise bid levels.  
 
We explore this issue in the context of a valuation project concerned with The Battle of 
Lexington State Historic Site in Lexington, MO.    3
Introduction 
The use of Stated Preference (SP) estimation techniques in non-market valuation 
has increased dramatically over the past couple of decades. A variety of SP methods have 
been created and refined including the Contingent Valuation (CV) method, the 
Contingent Behavior (CB) method, and the Choice Experiment (CE) methods. These 
methods have been used to value a variety of goods from water quality to cultural 
heritage.  
An important consideration in the use of these methods is the design of the bids 
that are presented to the respondents. A great deal of work has been done on the issue of 
bid design in both single and double-bounded frameworks, including the effect of 
changes in bid range and interval on willingness to pay (wtp) estimates, the effect of 
changing the number of surveys at each bid level on wtp estimates, and the effect of 
truncating the bid distribution. See Cameron and Huppert (1989), Duffield and Patterson 
(1988, 1991),  Cooper and Loomis (1992), Alberini (1995), Boyle, MacDonald, Cheng, 
and McCollum (1998), Scarpa and Bateman (2000), and Roach, Boyle, and Welsh 
(2002).  
To date, no work has been done on whether the dollar/cent presentation of the bid 
has any impact on willingness to pay estimates. It may be the case that respondents 
perceive bids presented in whole dollar amounts differently than bids that are not 
presented in whole dollars. One possibility is that the respondent may infer that the dollar 
amount they have been presented with is a more precise representation of the true cost if 
it contains cents. This in turn might cause them to answer the question differently than if 
they were presented with a round dollar amount and felt that this was an imprecise guess   4
by the researcher at the true cost. This issue is similar to discussion in the literature 
concerning the respondent’s budget constraint. Some researchers have argued that 
respondents may ignore or downplay their budget constraint when answering valuation 
questions, and reminding them of their budget constraint prior to asking the valuation 
question can have an impact on their answer (Arrow et al. 1993; Loomis, Gonzalez-
Caban, and Gregory 1994; Kemp and Maxwell 1993).  
To examine the issue of whether the exact form of the bid influences the 
respondent’s willingness to pay, we used a standard contingent valuation question with a 
variation on the standard bid design. In particular, we presented one half of the 
respondents with bids in round dollar amounts, which we refer to as the “imprecise” bids, 
and the other half we presented with bids in dollar/cent amounts, which we refer to as the 
“precise” bids. In the following sections we describe the survey, the bid design, the 
models estimated with each subsample, and the conclusions we draw. 
The Survey 
The data used in this investigation was gathered using a survey designed to elicit 
information about respondent’s attitudes and values for the Battle of Lexington State 
Historic Site (SHS) located in Lexington, Missouri. Lexington was the site of an 
important Civil War battle that took place in 1861. The battle, and the events that took 
place immediately after it, played a key role in determining the fate of the State of 
Missouri during the Civil War. The site, which is located approximately 40 miles east of 
Kansas City, draws approximately 29,000 visitors per year. The site includes a visitor’s 
center with a variety of exhibits designed to interpret the event before, during, and after 
the war. The preserved portion of the original battlefield is relatively modest in size, but   5
contains the remains of the original entrenchments as well as a preserved antebellum 
home that played a key role in the battle.  
The Battle of Lexington SHS Survey was designed in cooperation with the 
Missouri Department of Natural Resources, and was sent to a sample of 400 park visitors. 
The sample was randomly drawn from visitors who signed the guest registry located in 
the visitor’s center. It is important to note that this sampling procedure is less than ideal. 
Visitors who did not sign the registry have zero probability of being selected, while 
visitors who visited the park several times and signed the registry more than once have a 
higher probability of being selected than visitors who signed only once. Though this may 
result in a biased sample, for the purposes of this investigation it matters little.  
Standard survey procedures were followed with the Battle of Lexington SHS 
Survey. In particular, recipients who had not replied within two weeks of the initial 
mailing were sent a reminder postcard. Recipients who had not replied within an 
additional two weeks were sent a second copy of the survey. Those who did not reply to 
the second survey were not contacted further. Of the 400 surveys mailed, 66 were 
returned by the post office as undeliverable. The response rate for deliverable surveys 
was 40.42%. 
Bid Design and Model 
The survey included a dichotomous choice contingent valuation question that was 
designed to allow for estimation of the total value that respondents place on the site, 
including its values as both a recreation and cultural heritage good. The contingent 
valuation question took the form, “Would you vote ‘yes’ on a referendum that would 
create a Battle of Lexington State Historic Site Fund? This fund would insure that the site   6
is maintained it its current state and would be used to fund all expenditures including 
administrative expenditures and visitor services. Failure of the referendum would result 
in closure of the park. Suppose passage of the referendum would result in a one-time 
increase in your tax bill of  Bid $  (payable in five  5 $Bid  installments over a five year 
period).” Values of the bid varied across respondents according to a bid design of the 
following form: five bid level of $50, $150, $300, $600, and $1000 were used, with each 
bid level allocated to 20% of the respondents. Half of the survey recipients received a 
survey with this bid design. 
The other half of the recipients received a survey with a slightly modified bid 
design. To generate the bids for this subsample, a randomly-drawn amount of cents was 
added to the original bid design. The amount of cents added was drawn from a uniform 
distribution with a minimum of -$2 and a maximum of +$2. For example, the first 20% 
of the first subsample was presented with a bid of $50, while the first 20% of the second 
subsample was presented with bids that might look like: $49.63, $50.76, $51.12, $48.42, 
etc. The mean bid for the first 20% of the second subset is $50 by design. The resulting 
bid design presented to the second subset of recipients consists of 200 unique bids, 
although the bids are tightly clustered around the bid levels presented to the first subset of 
recipients. 
The valuation model we use is based on the approach taken by Cameron (1988). 
In particular, the respondent will answer “yes” to the dichotomous choice contingent 
valuation question if their willingness to pay for the good in question is greater than the 
bid they are presented with. We can characterize the probability of respondent i 
answering “yes” in the following manner    7
[ ] [ ] Pr Pr ii i yes wtp Bid => .   (1) 
Assume that the respondent’s willingness to pay takes the form 
ii i wtp X β ε =+ ,   (2) 
where i wtp  represents consumer i’s willingness to pay, β  is a parameter vector,  i X  is a 
data matrix, and  i ε  is a mean zero, iid random error. Combining (1) and (2), we get 
[ ] [ ] Pr Pr ii i i yes X Bid βε =+ > .   (3) 








− ⎡⎤ =− Φ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
. (4) 
Equation (4) can be used to estimate the parameters of the willingness to pay function as 
well as the standard deviation, σ .  
Model Results and Hypothesis Tests 
  The first step in estimating the model discussed above is the explicit specification 
of the willingness to pay function described in equation (2). We assume that willingness 
to pay takes the following form 
0 1 234 ii i i i i wtp Inc Gen Age Ed β ββ β βε =+ + + + + , (5) 
where  i wtp  represents consumer i’s willingness to pay,  i Inc  represents income,  i Gen  
represents gender,  i Age  represents age,  i Ed represents education, and  i ε  represents the 
random error. This model was estimated using both the precise and imprecise 
subsamples. The results of these estimations are shown in Table 1.  
  Column two of Table 1 contains the raw parameter estimates and t-statistics for 
the precise subsample. These parameters must be adjusted in order to correctly interpret   8
them. An examination of equation (4) shows that the parameter associated with the bid is 
actually the reciprocal of the standard deviation. The other raw parameter estimates are 
also confounded with the standard deviation and must be adjusted. Column three contains 
the adjusted parameter estimates for the precise subsample. Columns four and five 
contain the raw and adjusted parameter estimates for the imprecise subsample.  
  An important thing to note about the precise and imprecise results is that the 
parameter associated with the bid is statistically significant for the subsample estimated 
with precise bids while it is not statistically significant for the subsample estimated with 
imprecise bids. This presents a problem because we cannot reliably form the bid function 
if we cannot argue that the coefficient on bid is statistically different from zero.  
In order to explicitly test whether this difference in the way the bid is presented to 
the respondent has an effect on the way people respond to the valuation question, we 
conduct a hypothesis test of equality between the bid parameters for the precise and 
imprecise samples. The null hypothesis is that all parameters between the precise and 
imprecise models are equal, while the alternative hypothesis is that all parameters except 
the bid parameter are equal between the precise and imprecise models. Specifically, the 
hypothesis test takes the following form: 
PI
0 : Bid Bid H β β =  and 
PI
00 β β =  and 
PI
11 β β =  and 
PI
22 β β =  and 
PI
33 β β =  and 
PI
44 β β =  
PI : A Bid Bid H β β ≠  and 
PI
00 β β =  and 
PI
11 β β =  and 
PI
22 β β =  and 
PI
33 β β =  and 
PI
44 β β =  
where P indicates precise and I indicates imprecise. This hypothesis can be tested using a 
likelihood ratio test. The test statistic has a 
2 χ  distribution with one degree of freedom. 
The value of the test statistic for this hypothesis test is 3.59 while critical value for a 10%   9
level of significance is 2.71. We therefore reject the hypothesis that the bid parameter is 
equal between the precise and imprecise subsamples.  
  The result of this hypothesis test is evidence that respondents very well may 
respond differently to bids that are presented in round numbers than to bids that are 
presented in dollars and cents. It also implies that the model estimated with imprecise 
bids results in a variance that is larger by a statistically significant amount than models 
estimated with precise bids. Recall that the bid coefficient is the reciprocal of the 
standard deviation. As there is an inverse relationship between the estimate of the 
willingness-to-pay variance and the coefficient on the bid amount, we cannot reject the 
notion that the variance in willingness-to-pay for the imprecise bid subsample is infinite. 
This divergence in estimation results is perplexing if it results solely from a difference in 
the way in which bid amounts were presented to the respondents. Before we move 
towards that conclusion, we discuss the contingent valuation literature regarding 
willingness-to-pay variance estimation. 
Monte Carlo Analysis 
  One possible explanation of the observed difference between the precise 
and imprecise results could be that differences in the structure of the two bid designs may 
lead to differences in the statistical results. If this can be eliminated as a cause of the 
observed differences, the implication would be that our empirical results suggest a 
behavioral difference among respondents presented with imprecise bid levels and those 
with precise bid levels.   
We examine this issue with a Monte Carlo simulation. Crooker and Herriges 
(2004) formally explore the effect of bid design on estimators of willingness to pay   10
variance. Their results suggest that highly flexible semi-nonparametric techniques are 
much more sensitive to bid design than more commonly-used parametric techniques. In 
particular, poor bid design and outliers can have more estimation influence in the semi-
nonparametric estimation setting. As the model we have used in this investigation is an 
example of the traditional parametric approach, our estimation results are likely not being 
driven by the bid design. In fact, we would note that although the precise bid amounts 
include a different bid amount for all respondents, the bid amount values are clustered at 
the same percentiles of the willingness-to-pay distribution as the imprecise bids.  
The bid designs considered in the Crooker and Herriges (2004) experiment 
spanned the percentiles of the willingness-to-pay distribution. Considering the percentiles 
of the population willingness-to-pay distribution, our precise bid design is virtually 
identical to the 5 bid level imprecise bid design. However, to remove doubt regarding the 
spread of bid designs used influencing our results; we design and explore the following 
Monte Carlo investigation. 
  We take the estimation results from a model that restricts all parameters to be 
equal between the precise and imprecise models and treat those parameters as the actual 
population parameters. The results of estimation of this model are shown in Table 2. 
Next, we randomly draw a subsample from the population by assigning the population 
parameters of willingness-to-pay and drawing a disturbance term from a normal 
distribution with the variance again coming from the estimated population variance 
parameter. This process creates a simulated draw from the population having precisely 
the characteristics imposed by the population parameters.     11
  With the sample created, we form two distinct pseudo-samples. For the first 
pseudo-sample, we mimic the data that an econometrician would observe when 
presenting the imprecise bid design to the simulated respondent. The imprecise bid 
design is precisely the bid design we used in the actual survey. We simulate respondent 
behavior by recording a “yes” for the CV question if the simulated willingness-to-pay we 
generated is greater than the bid amount and a “no” otherwise. Using this data, we 
estimate our willingness-to-pay model described above as if this was the observed data. 
  For the second pseudo-sample, we mimic the data an econometrician would 
collect by presenting the precise bid design to the simulated responded. Again, we use the 
same bid design mechanism as that used in the actual survey. The simulated respondent 
behavior is recorded as a “yes” to the CV question when simulated willingness-to-pay 
exceeds the bid amount and a “no” otherwise. We then use this data to estimate 
willingness-to-pay while storing the results. 
  The result of this simulation and estimation process is two sets of parameter 
estimates for exactly the same set of respondents with one set corresponding to the 
precise bid design format and one set corresponding to the imprecise bid design format. 
Any difference in parameter estimates must be due to the statistical ramifications of 
presenting bid levels at different willingness-to-pay percentiles. Yet, as these percentile 
differences are largely negligible, as the bid amount for the precise bid design is less than 
$2 from the imprecise bid design, we anticipate the resulting two sets of parameter 
estimates will be virtually identical. Recall that the variance of willingness-to-pay we are 
imposing on the population is 1,562,500 (the standard deviation is 1250). This implies 
that the difference of $1 in bid amount is 0.0008 standard deviations in willingness-to-  12
pay. Again, this suggests the bids are nearly identical across imprecise and precise bid 
designs in terms of willingness-to-pay percentiles.  
As noted above, if our Monte Carlo results indicate convergence between the two 
sets of parameter estimates, we must conclude that the empirical divergence we observed 
between precise and imprecise bid levels is not due to statistical design. The implication 
is that our empirical results suggest that respondents react differently to precise bids than 
they do to imprecise bids.   
  The Monte Carlo results do indicate that the two sets of parameters are virtually 
identical. We generated 1,000 samples as described above and estimated the two sets of 
parameters. The average difference in the mean log-likelihood function across pseudo-
samples was -0.000011. The average difference in coefficients on bid amounts across 
pseudo-samples was -0.000000347594. The Monte Carlo results suggest that the 
differences in empirical estimates we observed for the imprecise and precise bid amounts 
does not stem from statistical explanations. This suggests that the dollar/cent form of the 
bid may influence the way in which respondents answer stated preference questions.  
Conclusions 
  In this paper, we have taken a closer look at the effect that the form of the bid 
presented to the respondent has on their response to a valuation question. An obvious 
explanation is that respondents may infer that a bid presented in dollars and cents is a 
more accurate estimate of the true cost of the good being asked about, whereas a bid 
presented in round dollars may signal that the bid is simply a guess at the true cost. This 
may lead to a behavioral difference in the way respondents answer the valuation question. 
We test this proposition using a survey designed to gather contingent valuation   13
information concerning the Battle of Lexington State Historic Site, and find statistical 
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Table 1: Raw and transformed parameter estimates 








Bid  .0010 
(2.013)*  1000  0.0007 
(1.254)  1428.57 
Constant  1.1890 
(1.605)  1189.00  1.0046 
(0.6467)  1435.14 
Income  0.0013 
(0.297)  1.30  -0.0011 
(-0.251)  -1.57 
Gender  -0.2170 
(-0.620)  -217.00  0.1504 
(0.478)  214.86 
Age  -0.0125 
(-1.200)  -12.50  -0.0189 
(-1.948)  -27.00 
Education  0.6847 
(1.928)*  684.70  0.2361 
(0.732)  337.29 
n  64  70  
   16
Table 2: Constrained model (both precise and imprecise data used) 




Bid  .0008 
(2.295)*  1250 
Constant  0.9604 
(2.023)*  1175.50 
Income  -0.0003 
(-0.101)  -0.375 
Gender  -0.0272 
(-0.119)  -34.00 
Age  -0.0133 
(-1.952)  -16.63 
Education  0.4853 
(2.079)*  606.63 
n 134   
 